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Abstract: This paper explores the suitability of risk regulation, and particularly the EU 
approach to risk regulation, as a conceptual and organisational framework for the EU’s battle 
against climate change. It argues that such exploration, in the first place, requires a thorough 
understanding of the discourses, agenda, and strategies that constitute, respectively, the risk 
regulation paradigm, the EU risk regulation paradigm, and the climate risk paradigm. The 
analysis of the three paradigms reveals not only points of overlap, but also substantial 
divergences between the three paradigms, with the most pronounced tensions occurring 
between the EU risk regulation and climate risk paradigms. The paper therefore reinforces 
concerns over a possible colonisation of climate change policy by EU risk regulation and 
argues that climate change regulation has a better chance of effectiveness if it develops 
alongside but separately from EU risk regulation (‘co-existence’). The latter scenario also offers 
prospects for comparison and exchange between regulatory regimes (‘cross-regime learning’), 
which could help both regimes to face, and possibly overcome, their specific weaknesses. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE EU AT THE CROSSROADS OF RISK, 
REGULATION, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
This paper examines the regulatory response to climate change in the European 
Union. Copenhagen notwithstanding, the EU has been making rapid progress in 
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developing an arsenal of Directives, Regulations, and Decisions to slow down the 
pace of global warming, and this raises important questions about the ideas, 
objectives, and approaches that inform the EU’s actions as a climate change 
regulator.1  
Climate change is understood as a major global environmental risk, and 
climate change regulation can be seen as a variant of risk regulation. The 
appropriateness of risk-based approaches to combat climate change cannot, 
however, be taken for granted, and has been challenged explicitly in recent 
scholarship.2 Questions can also be asked about the variety of risk-based 
approaches that it is appropriate to apply in this context. This paper aims to 
contribute to the debate by tracing the salient features of three regulatory 
paradigms: the risk regulation paradigm, the EU risk regulation paradigm, and the 
(nascent) climate change risks paradigm within the EU. It will be argued that an 
understanding of regulation, and regulatory challenges, in this area cannot be fully 
achieved without an appreciation of the roles of, and interplay between, these 
paradigms. The paper will show that even a preliminary foray into the discourse, 
agenda, and strategies of climate change regulation uncovers points of divergence 
as well as overlap between the climate change risk paradigm on the one hand, and 
the risk regulation and, particularly, EU risk regulation paradigms on the other. 
Bearing in mind paradigmatic overlaps and divergences, the paper explores the 
desirability of three potential development trajectories for climate change 
regulation, starting with colonisation, which would entail the EU risk regulation 
paradigm subsuming climate change regulation.3 A second potential trajectory, co-
existence, would see climate change regulation developing and maturing separately 
from EU risk regulation. Finally, the paper moots the possibility of regulatory 
development through cross-regime learning, which would arise out of the 
potential of different regulatory regimes to learn through interaction and 
comparison.  The latter scenario is one that may yield the most promising results, 
but it is also the most demanding as it assumes both an advanced understanding of 
the dynamics that imbue different paradigms and a willingness to revisit and 
challenge some well-established notions about health and environmental risk 
governance in the European Union. The battle against climate change is, 
therefore, not only a regulatory challenge of unprecedented scale and urgency; it 
also throws down the gauntlet to risk regulation scholarship to rethink and 
reposition itself for a new era. 
                                                     
1 cf I. Bartle, ‘A Strategy for Better Climate Change Regulation: Towards a Public Interest Orientated 
Regulatory Regime’ (2009)18 European Politics 689. 
2 N. Pidgeon and C. Butler, ‘Risk Analysis and Climate Change’ (2009) 18(5) Environmental Politics 670. 
3 This development is related to but distinct from the phenomenon of ‘risk colonisation’, as used by 
Rothstein, Huber, and Gaskell to describe the growing centrality of risk in regulation, which they explain 
as caused by the growth of regulatory frameworks to regulate societal risk (rather than the growth of 
societal risk itself) and the increasing need to manage the associated institutional risks of risk regulation. 
See H. Rothstein, M. Huber, and G. Gaskell, ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: the Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk’ (2006) 35(1) Economy and Society 91, 99. 
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Before reviewing the three risk paradigms, the article gives a very brief 
overview of the current state of EU climate change regulation. This is intended to 
offer readers more familiar with risk regulation than climate change a secure 
enough footing for the ensuing analysis. The article then charts the emergence of 
‘risk’ as a conceptual framework for climate change, and registers the concerns 
voiced in response to this evolution. The following sections trace the contours of 
the aforementioned three risk paradigms. Finally, and most appropriately for an 
inquiry into the nature of risk and regulation, the article concludes with a range of 
forecasts, or scenarios, on the evolution of climate change regulation, and the 
related development of risk regulation, in the European Union. 
 
 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION IN THE EU 
 
The European Union is developing an impressive and exponentially growing 
arsenal in the battle against climate change. In very broad lines, the EU approach 
to climate change aims to respond to the need for both mitigation and adaptation, 
and emphasises the importance of integrating climate change considerations into 
other EU law and policy areas.4 Under the Kyoto Protocol,5 the EU committed to 
an overall reduction of eight per cent of greenhouse gases (GHG) compared to 
emission levels in 1990.6 For the period of 2012 to 2020, the EU has set a target of 
a 20 per cent reduction against the 1990 reference level, with an option to increase 
to 30 per cent if its efforts are matched by comparable emissions reduction 
commitments from other developed nations, and by adequate contributions from 
economically more advanced developing nations, ‘according to their 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’.7 
In terms of instruments to achieve emission reduction, the jewel in the EU 
crown is undoubtedly the emissions trading regime, 8 as laid down in the 2003 
                                                     
4 Integration of environmental policy concerns is required pursuant to Article 11 TFEU (formerly Article 
6 EC). For a detailed treatment of the integration principle, see N. Dhondt, Integration of Environmental 
Protection into Other EC Policies (The Netherlands: Europa Law Publishing, 2003; and A. Lenshow (ed), 
Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe (London: Earthscan, 2002). 
5 Kyoto (Japan), 10 December 1997 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (1998) International Legal 
Materials 22. 
6 Council Decision 2002/358/EC Concerning the Approval, on Behalf of the European Community, of 
the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Joint 
Fulfilment of Commitments Thereunder [2002] OJ L130/1. 
7 European Parliament and Council Decision 406/2009/EC on the Effort of Member States to Reduce 
their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Commitments 
up to 2020 [2009] OJ L140/136. See also 20 20 by 2020. Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity, Commission 
Communication of 23 January 2008, Com(2008)30 final. At the point of writing, the prospects for this 
option being taken up are glum: the largely failed Copenhagen negotiations signalled loud and clear that 
many key players, such as the US, Russia, and China remain exceedingly reluctant to concretise mitigation 
commitments.  
8 Whether we are talking about diamonds or cubic zirconia is disputed. A full discussion of the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of emissions trading as a climate change mitigation instrument exceeds the ambitions of 
this article, but see, eg, R. Baldwin ‘Regulation Lite: the Rise of Emissions Trading’ (2008) 2 Regulation and 
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Emissions Trading Directive and ensuing amendments.9 The trading aspect may 
be the most visible, but it is by no means the sole feature of what amounts to a 
highly orchestrated regulatory programme to determine, allocate, and enforce 
maximum emission levels (caps) from the European, national, and down to 
sectoral and installation level, and to create a sufficient degree of transactional 
transparency, verifiability, and reliability to facilitate cost-optimising trade in 
emission allowances.10 To achieve the EU’s current eight per cent reduction target, 
its Member States have committed to differentiated overall reduction targets.11 
Following allocation criteria laid down in the Directive, and taking into account 
public opinion, the Member States were required to draw up National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs) commensurate with their emission reduction targets for the first two 
trading periods (2005-2008 and 2008-2012).12 These NAPs were subject to review 
and approval by the European Commission. A Member State’s NAP sets out the 
total quantity of allowances that it plans to allocate, as well as the allocation 
proportion per industrial sector covered by the ETD. Unsurprisingly, the adoption 
of national emission quota, the determination of sectoral allocation, and the 
Commission’s role in approving NAPs proved highly controversial, causing 
tempers to flare between the different Member States critical of each other’s 
allocation methodologies, between the latter and the Commission, between the 
private sector, national governments, and the Commission, etc.13 From 2013 
onwards, sectoral allocation will be centralised and harmonised, obviating the need 
for new NAPs.14 Whether this will free the allocation process from controversy 
remains to be seen. The Member States allocate emission allowances to individual 
installations covered under the ETD, again respecting general criteria laid down 
therein. The lion’s share of allowances is grandfathered, but over time a growing 
proportion will be auctioned.15 At the end of each trading year, installations must 
surrender allowances to cover their emissions. Excess allowances can be traded for 
                                                                                                                                       
Governance 193; R. Stewart, ‘Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Opportunities and 
Obstacles’ in R. Stewart, P. Sands, and R. Revesz (eds), Environmental Law, the Economy and Sustainable 
Development (Cambridge: CUP, 2000); D. Ellerman and B. Buchner, ‘The European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation and Early Results’ (2007) 1 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 
66; A.D. Ellerman, F. Convery, and C. de Perthuis, Pricing Carbon (Cambridge: CUP, 2010). 
9 Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading 
Within the Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, as amended by 
Directive 2009/29/EC [2009] OJ L140/63. 
10 See, inter alia, J.B. Skjaerseth, EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and Implementation 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2008); M. Faure and M. Peeters (eds), Climate Change and European Emissions Trading: 
Lessons for Theory and Practice (UK: Edward Elgar, 2008); M. Wråke, Emissions Trading: The Ugly Duckling in 
European Climate Policy (Sweden: Swedish Environmental Research Institute, July 2009). See also the recent 
literature review by Frank J. Convery, ‘Reflections – The Emerging Literature on Emissions Trading in 
Europe’ (2009) 3 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 121.  
11 nn 5 and 6 above. 
12 We are currently in Phase II, 2008-2012. 
13 See M. Mehling, ‘Emission Trading and National Allocation in the Member States: An Achilles Heel of 
European Climate Policy?’ (2005) 5 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 113. 
14 ETD Article 9, as amended by Dir. 2009/29/EC, n 7 above. 
15 ibid, Arts 10, 10a-c. 
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profit. Furthermore, the ETD, together with the so-called Linking Directive,16 lay 
down conditions for the acquisition of emission credits through Joint 
Implementation and Clean Development Mechanisms.17 
The emissions trading regime was bound to capture the public’s imagination, 
as it is both the most tangible expression of the EU’s commitment to cut back on 
its GHG emissions, and of its faith in economic incentives as drivers of industrial 
and social change. It entails momentous efforts to create a global market through 
artificially engineered scarcity, the introduction of a new genus of financial 
commodity in the form of emission allowances and credits, and the near 
insurmountable task of contemplating countless scenarios, possible responses, and 
interventions to strive to ensure that the regime delivers on economic, 
environmental, and financial fronts in a legitimate fashion. It is, however, by no 
means the only EU instrument for climate change mitigation: GHG emission 
reduction is equally at the core of a sprawling set of new measures addressing, inter 
alia, tighter CO2 emission limits for vehicles,18 promotion of renewable energy,19 
increased energy efficiency for industrial and domestic buildings, appliances and 
services,20 eco-design and labelling,21 carbon capture and storage (CCS),22 etc. 
Moreover, in observance of the integration principle, the climate change regulatory 
agenda is partly one of amendment to existing legislation, as areas such as EU 
waste management, air pollution control, water management, and the regulation of 
industrial activity must be made responsive to climate change concerns. 
The EU climate change strategy aims to curb temperature rises, not to stop 
global warming in its tracks altogether. This is partly because an even more 
ambitious emissions reduction programme is considered beyond the realm of the 
politically, economically, and technologically feasible, but also because, strictly 
speaking, the horse has bolted: the existing build-up of GHG in the atmosphere 
will cause global temperatures to rise in the coming decades, regardless of our 
present and future actions. Hence, the climate change challenge is one of 
                                                     
16 Directive 2004/101/EC Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community, in Respect of the Kyoto Protocol's Project 
Mechanisms [2004] OJ L338/18. 
17 D. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ 
(1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 451; F. Lecocq and P. Ambrosi, ‘The Clean Development 
Mechanism: History, Status and Prospects’ (2007) 1 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 143; D. 
Pearce, Joint Implementation: A General Overview (CSEGRE Working Paper, GEC 94-19).   
18 Regulation (EC) 443/2009 Setting Emission Performance Standards for New Passenger Cars as Part of 
the Community’s Integrated Approach to Reduce CO2 Emissions from Light-Duty Vehicles [2009] OJL 
140/1. 
19 Directive 2009/28/EC on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources [2009] OJL 
140/16. 
20 Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the 
Energy Performance of Buildings [2003] OJL 1/65 and Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Energy Performance of Buildings COM(2008)780 final; Directive 
2005/32/EC Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign Requirements for Energy-Using 
Products [2005] OJL 191/29; Directive 2006/32/EC on Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services 
[2006] OJL 114/64. 
21 Directive 2009/125/EC Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign Requirements for 
Energy-Related Products [2009] OJL 285/10; Regulation 66/2010 on the EU Ecolabel [2010] OJL 27/1.  
22 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJL 140/114. 
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adaptation as well as mitigation. The EU’s climate change adaptation strategy is at 
a relatively early stage of development,23 and poses a number of particular 
challenges. The efforts of predicting overall rises in temperature under business-
as-usual scenarios are enormous, but they pale in comparison to the challenges of 
forecasting actual localised impacts of climate change, taking into account a range 
of different global, European, and domestic mitigation scenarios, formulating 
reasonable adaptation responses, estimating costs and benefits of alternative 
approaches, planning for contingencies and side-effects, etc.24 Moreover, the 
generally localised impact of adaptation policies raises difficult questions of both 
EU competency and of shared responsibility. To contend with these challenges, 
EU environment ministers have recently agreed that initial EU adaptation action 
should in the first instance concentrate on the colossal task of data production, 
gathering, and exchange, on climate-proofing existing EU policies, and 
coordinating cross-border responses.25 However, if the history of EU 
environmental law serves as any indication, it is to be expected that over time the 
EU’s involvement in adaptation policies, and the corresponding development of 
implementing regulatory strategies, will deepen. 
 
 
 
THE RISE OF RISK IN CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
In social science ‘risk’ has become a loaded notion entailing an extensive set of 
assumptions on how societies are governed, how change is experienced, and how 
responses are formulated.26 Thus, when talking about the rise of risk in climate 
change, we refer to more than just increased use of the term, and include a 
growing tendency to see climate change as appropriately responded to with 
governance strategies built around risk analysis and management. This is 
exemplified by, for instance, the treatment of scientific research as evidence, the 
growing emphasis on calculation and the ascendance of cost-benefit and risk-
benefit analyses in deliberation and decision-making on climate change.27 The 
publication of the Stern Review28 is often seen as a watershed moment in forging 
the connection between risk and climate change as this presented climate change 
as a serious and pressing but still manageable problem to which society could 
respond rationally by comparing the predicted global costs of action to those of 
inaction.29 Recent EU statements, too, borrow heavily from the risk discourse, 
                                                     
23 Commission White Paper, Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action, COM(2009)147 
final. 
24 See Bartle, n 1 above, 698. 
25 ‘Leaders Focus on How to Share Climate Aid Burden’ (29 October 2009) ENDS Europe Daily. 
26 J. Adams, Risk (London: UCL Press, 1995).  
27 cf B. Hutter, The Attractions of Risk-based Regulation: Accounting for the Emergence of Risk Ideas in Regulation 
(CARR Discussion Paper 33, LSE), 3-4. 
28 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, the Stern Review (Cambridge: CUP, 2007). 
29 n 2 above, 674. 
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expressing the predicted impacts of climate change, and of climate change policy, 
in terms of costs, benefits, trade offs, and opportunity. The subtitle of the “20 20 
by 2020” Commission Communication, after all, reads: ‘Europe’s Climate Change 
Opportunity’ (emphasis added).30  
First and foremost among the governance strategies within a risk-based 
approach, is risk regulation. The growing connection between risk regulation and 
climate change has not gone unobserved, with authors such as Mark Stallworthy 
commenting that law-makers address new problems, including those posed by 
climate change, against a broader picture of regulatory evolution. He continues 
that this evolution ‘has seen a developing emphasis on risk-based management. 
This can be characterised by features that include ex ante setting of clear objectives, 
across identified timelines, supported by transparent and participatory processes.’31 
In assessing the impact of the risk discourse on climate change, Stallworthy’s 
analysis is rather friendly to the risk focus – alluding to risk regulation’s well-
documented strengths in structuring and rationalising decision-making processes. 
Others, however, are less sanguine about the conceptualisation of the climate 
change challenge as a risk regulation enterprise. In a 2009 article on ‘Risk Analysis 
and Climate Change’, Pidgeon and Butler argue that conventional risk-based 
approaches are ill-suited to respond to the challenges of climate change, and 
incapable of delivering the scale and intensity of change required.32 In light of the 
incontrovertible truth that, to date, climate change strategies have failed to deliver 
significant cuts or successful adaptation,33 these are concerns that cannot be 
discounted peremptorily.  
As climate change and risk regulation grow closer in the EU and beyond, the 
question whether this is a match made in heaven, or a recipe for disaster, poses 
itself with growing urgency. The analysis below aims to enlighten this debate by 
deepening our understanding about the relation between risk, regulation, climate 
change, and EU governance. It will be contended here that it is essential to 
understand these developments with reference to the interplay of the three risk 
regulation paradigms referred to above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
30 EU Commission, ‘20 20 by 2020. Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity’ COM(2008)30 final.  
31 M. Stallworthy, ‘Legislating Against Climate Change: A UK Perspective on a Sisyphean Challenge’ 
(2009) 72(3) MLR 412, 418. 
32 n 2 above. cf M. Granger Morgan, M. Kandlikar, J. Risbey, and H. Dowlatabadi, ‘Why Conventional 
Tools for Policy Analysis are Often Inadequate for Problems of Global Change’ (1999) 41 Climatic Change  
270; H. Bulkeley, ‘Governing Climate Change: the Politics of Risk Society?’ (2001) 26(4) Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 442, 442-444; Rothstein, Huber, and Gaskell, n 3 above, 91; and H. Rothstein, 
P. Irving, T. Walden, and R. Yearsley, ‘The Risks of Risk-Based Regulation: Insights from the 
Environmental Policy Domain’ (2006) 32 Environment International 1065. 
33 n 2 above, 682. 
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THE RISK REGULATION PARADIGM 
 
Risk regulation has become such a staple of contemporary law and policy that it 
barely needs an introduction. In order to discern the distinctive features of EU 
risk regulation, however, as well as the particularities of risk within the climate 
change field, it is useful first to contemplate, in general terms, what we mean when 
we talk about ‘risk’ as a catalyst for regulation, what the agenda is of risk 
regulation, and how regulation seeks to achieve its targets. 
In common parlance, we qualify a particular situation or activity as a risk 
when we are aware of the possibility of undesirable consequences. To gauge the 
seriousness of the risk, we in the first place take into account the likelihood of 
negative impacts and the anticipated magnitude of impacts.34 Risk regulation, then, 
becomes the exercise of public authority (however broadly construed) with intent 
to affect the likelihood and/or magnitude of socially undesirable events (‘social 
bads’).35  
As an expression of likelihood, or probability, risk is inherently future-
oriented. In German jurisprudence of the 1980s to early 1990s, risk was often 
defined by reference to the concept of ‘danger’.36 Following a  ‘danger-based’ 
approach, we acquire experience about the negative impacts of certain goods or 
activities and modulate our behaviour on the basis of that experience. 37 To give a 
comfortingly domestic example, if I scald my fingers by grabbing the steel handle 
of a frying pan on the stove, and particularly if this happens more than once, I will 
respond by using oven mitts in the future, or will adopt another remedy such as 
replacing my frying pan with a new model equipped with better insulated handles. 
A risk-based approach, by comparison, engages not only with experienced social 
bads, but also with future ones. Frying pans are tested for safety before being 
released onto the market. Safe handling and care instructions are drawn up and 
passed on to the users. Product standards prescribe the use of heat-resistant 
substances in the manufacture of pan handles. 
                                                     
34 n 3 above, 92. 
35 cf C. Hood, H. Rothstein, and R. Baldwin, The Government of Risk. Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004) 3. It should be noted that the definition of  regulation generally, and risk regulation 
in particular, is both evolving and contested. For a critical and more comprehensive discussion of both 
terms, see J. Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-regulation in a 
"Post-regulatory" World’ (2002) 54 Current Legal Problems 103; and ‘Risk Regulation’ in R. Baldwin and M. 
Lodge, Oxford Handbook on Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2010 forthcoming). The less challenging mainstream 
definition deployed here is, however, adequate to the purposes of the article. 
36 D. Cansier, ‘Gefahrenabwehr und Risikoforsorge im Umweltschutz und der Spielraum für 
Ökonomische Instrumente’ (1994) 7 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 643; K.-H. Ladeur, ‘Von der 
Gefahrenabwehr zum Risikomanagement im Stoffbezogenen Umweltrecht’ in G. Winter (ed), 
Risikoanalyse und Risikoabwehr im Chemikalienrecht (Germany: Umweltrechtliche Studien, 1994) 241-263. 
37 C. Joerges, ‘Law, Science and the Management of Risks to Health at the National, European and 
International Level – Stories on Baby Dummies, Mad Cows and Hormones in Beef’ (2001) 7 Colum J Eur 
L 2; K.-H. Ladeur, ‘Deregulating Environmental Law in a Perspective of Stimulating Knowledge 
Generation’ in U. Collier (ed), Deregulation in the European Union: Environmental Perspectives (UK: Routledge, 
1998) 43. 
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Presenting future negative occurrences as potential adverse effects, or impacts, 
implies that we operate on a premise of causation – an assumption that the 
negative consequence, whatever it may be, happens because we engage or omit to 
engage in a certain activity. I risk getting wet because I go for a walk under a 
threatening sky; polar bears are at risk of extinction because we are not doing 
enough to mitigate climate change. The theoretical possibility of a solution is what 
separates a problem from a calamity. Similarly, the theoretical possibility of choice 
distinguishes risk from the fickleness of fate. Risk, therefore, implies some degree 
of free will and ability to act; if harm is absolutely certain and inevitable, whatever 
we do or wherever we go, the risk evaporates. By extension, risk regulation 
assumes the possibility of at least some degree of influence, with at least some 
degree of predictability.  
Of equal relevance is that risk does not have a wholly negative connotation; it 
is perceived against a backdrop of opportunity. There are, first, the benefits to be 
enjoyed if potential adverse effects do not materialise, such as the joys of a brisk 
walk in dry weather, or the professed value added of a more abundant and reliable 
food supply after switching to genetically modified crops.38 Second, responding to 
risk creates opportunity costs: we forego the option of exploiting the resources put 
towards risk mitigation in an alternative way.39 There is broad scientific consensus 
that, following a business-as-usual scenario, global temperatures will indeed rise;40 
the likelihood of this not happening is now considered so remote that even 
staunch sceptics would think twice before making the argument.41 However, the 
complete failure of the recent Copenhagen negotiations to produce anything 
approximating firm commitments to cut back CO2 emissions suggests that many 
third country governments still doubt whether the benefits of mitigation outweigh 
the required investment at this point in time.  
Finally, within this conceptual framework, any quest to ‘eliminate risk’, 
whether through regulation or other means, becomes illusory. Not only does 
society willingly tolerate and even encourage a certain amount of risk-taking, but 
any attempt to cut out risk altogether is doomed to failure, as risk responses 
themselves create countervailing risks.42 By not going for a walk, I might put my 
health and fitness levels at risk, whatever the weather. Evidently, risks differ in 
likelihood and magnitude, but the altogether absence of risk remains a theoretical 
impossibility. All risk issues become risk choices and risk trade-offs. 
Our understanding of risk as future-oriented, impressionable, and double-
edged informs the agenda and strategies of risk regulation. Risk regulation does 
not aspire to eliminate risk but to substitute acceptable for unacceptable risk. To 
                                                     
38 M. Quaim and D. Zilberman, ‘Yield Effects of Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries’ 
(2003) 299 Science 900. 
39 See, eg, C. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1997) 298-317. 
40 ‘Top Scientists Affirm Consensus on Global Warming’ (20 February 2010) Environment News Service. 
41 cf W. McKibbin and P. Wilcoxen, ‘Climate Change after Kyoto. A Blueprint for a Realistic Approach’ 
(2002) The Brookings Review 8. 
42 J. Graham and J. Wiener, ‘Confronting Risk Tradeoffs’ in Graham and Wiener (eds), Risk vs. Risk 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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accomplish this, risk regulation carves up the amorphous totality of risks we are 
exposed to into discrete, manageable segments, and it engages with these segments 
to the exclusion of others.43 If not, the task of weighing risks against 
opportunities, which enables the determinations of acceptable/unacceptable risk 
that drive risk regulatory decision-making, would become unending and futile. 
Risk regulation, therefore, is as much about risk construction as it is about risk 
control.  
The construction of risk within the regulatory process requires considerable 
efforts in information production, selection, and collection, in order both to 
delineate the categories of risk that the regulation recognises, and to weigh and 
ultimately determine the acceptability of identified risks. To this end, risk 
regulation deploys techniques of information gathering, classification, and risk 
assessment, and maps out decision-making procedures that link assessments to 
control options.44 The atomisation of risk into an extensive but discrete range of 
selected harms, caused by specific forms of action or omission, fosters the 
individualisation of risk governance responsibility: it enables the identification of 
causal agents that become the target audience of risk regulation, and furthers the 
establishment of risk regulatory authorities working with a circumscribed mandate 
and interacting primarily with well-defined social groups (hazardous waste 
transporters, hedge fund managers, dangerous dog owners, consumers, nuclear 
facilities, etc). The communication tools vary, ranging from commands to 
incentives to ethics-based encouragements. Control options, in turn, run the 
gamut from decisions to ‘wait and see’, requests for further data production 
and/or advanced assessment, to information disclosure requirements, monitoring 
provisions, standard-setting, and mandatory restrictions. 
In the context of information production and processing, it is important to 
contemplate the relation between risk and uncertainty. Often, and particularly 
since the ascent of the precautionary principle, risk and uncertainty are treated as 
qualitatively different, even juxtaposed notions. Risk, it is said, qualifies situations 
where sufficient information exists to make a probabilistic assessment of 
likelihood and magnitude of harm.45 Uncertainty, in contrast, occurs where 
indications of harm exist, but there is insufficient data to conduct a ‘proper’ risk 
assessment.46 This distinction may serve as a rough and ready delineator of the 
remit of certain regulatory regimes, but it is essentially flawed. For one, it ignores 
that the information required to conduct a risk assessment does not exist ‘out 
there’, but is at least partially generated within the very context of regulation.  
Secondly, as defined above, the distinction is entirely subservient to the mode of 
conceiving of risk assessment. However, it is extremely valuable as a reminder that 
                                                     
43 n 2 above, 673. 
44 n 35 above. 
45 Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle COM(2000)1 final; V. Heyvaert, ‘Facing 
the Consequences of the Precautionary Principle in European Community Law’ (2006) European Law 
Review 185.  
46 cf P. O’Malley, ‘Uncertain Subjects: Risk, Liberalism and Contract,’ (2001) 29(4) Economy and Society 462. 
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risk regulation involves the creation of fictional certainty; unknown future events 
are translated into known probabilities and thereby become actionable.47 The 
regulatory response, too, implies the acceptance of a fictional or at the very least 
unexamined certainty, namely that rules can have a pre-determined impact on risk. 
Risk regulation does, however, tend to recognise the fragility of its belief system, 
and correspondingly creates opportunities for the integration of new information, 
for review and adaptation within regulation. 
Before moving on the distinctive profile of EU risk regulation, it should be 
acknowledged that this rather bloodless portrayal of the key features and dynamics 
of risk regulation masks a reality riddled by controversy. Longstanding 
disagreements over the quality of the information on which risk assessment and 
management should be based, over the dividing line between acceptable versus 
unacceptable risks, and over the choice of regulatory control techniques, have 
turned the field of risk regulation into an ideological battleground. Risk, as 
apparent from the preceding discussion, is a product of perception. Whose 
perception matters, or matters most, therefore becomes a crucial issue for 
regulators to wrestle with. Countries with advanced risk regulatory regimes tend  
heavily to favour expert-based identifications and assessments of risk, giving rise 
to critiques that alternative, ‘lay’ perceptions are overlooked to the detriment of 
regulatory quality and legitimacy.48 The tensions caused by the construction and 
integration of risk information into regulation run deeper and wider, however,  
than the familiar ‘science v public’ dilemma. Wider, because risks never affect all 
segments of the population and the natural world in the same way. The process of 
risk identification is therefore simultaneously one of selection, involving 
controversial normative judgement. Deeper, for even if roaring agreement existed 
about what kind of information should inform risk assessment and, consequently, 
management, this does not preclude debates about how this information should 
be generated, or about the regulator’s role in gathering, processing, and acting 
upon this information.49 
 
 
 
THE EU RISK REGULATION PARADIGM 
 
The bulk of EU regulation, including effectively all of EU environmental and 
health regulation, qualifies as risk regulation within the parameters set out above. 
                                                     
47 cf N. Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993). 
48 M. Everson and E. Vos, ‘European Risk Governance in a Global Context’, in E. Vos (ed), European 
Risk Governance. Its Science, its Inclusiveness and its Effectiveness (Connex Report Series Nr 6, 2008) 10-15; S. 
Rayner, ‘Democracy in the Age of Assessment: Reflections on the Roles of Expertise and Democracy in 
Public Sector Decision-Making’ (2003) 30 Science and Public Policy 163; J. Applegate, ‘A Beginning Not and 
End In Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making’ (1995) University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 1643; S. Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
49 See E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
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Yet when policy makers, academics, or reporters speak of ‘EU risk regulation’, 
they usually have something rather more specific in mind. Within the EU, risk 
regulation has become intimately associated with market regulation, and more 
precisely with regimes governing the production, commercialisation, and 
subsequent use of goods that either pose health and/or environmental risks of 
themselves (such as pesticides) or that incorporate risky technology (eg, goods 
containing nano-particles).50 In contrast, waste, air, water, and nature conservation 
regulation, although certainly risk-oriented, are more commonly labelled 
‘environmental regulation’. This divide is not cast in stone, and a typifying of, say, 
rules governing waste disposal as risk regulation would not be dismissed as 
mistaken. But undeniably, when discussing EU risk regulation, the examples that 
spring to mind will overwhelmingly come from the domains of product and 
technology regulation.   
The precise causes of the close association between EU risk and market 
regulation are open to debate, but we can readily discern some pertinent factors. 
The establishment of a common market was a foundational EU mission, making 
market regulation one of the first areas in which the EU got to flex its regulatory 
muscle. As early as 1967, the EU promulgated harmonised standards for the 
classification, packaging, and labelling of dangerous substances.51 This was a 
thoroughly market-facilitating endeavour, but one that nonetheless set the frame 
within which chemical risk discourses would later unfold.52 Trade conflicts over 
the compatibility of national risk regulation with the dictates of Articles 34 and 36 
TFEU also supplied the backdrop for the European Court of Justice’s first 
musings on the nature of risk and its role in regulation.53 Conflict is in many ways 
disruptive, but it is grist to the mill of academic scholarship. Trade and marketing 
disputes, revolving around goods ranging from beef to beer to slimming pills, have 
fuelled academic, regulatory, and even civil society’s interest in risk regulation in 
no small measure.54 We need only consider the avalanche of studies on risk 
regulation in the wake of the tuna/dolphin, beef hormones, shrimp/turtle, 
asbestos, and GMO trade disputes within the WTO to appreciate that this is not a 
                                                     
50 A search on ‘risk regulation’ in the European Union’s ECLAS database overwhelmingly generates 
references to writings on the regulation of genetically modified organisms, nanotechnology, and 
chemicals. cf n 35 above, 44. 
51 Directive 67/548/EEC on the Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of 
the Member States Relating to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances 
[1967] OJ Nr. 196/1.  
52 cf V. Heyvaert, Coping With Uncertainty. The Regulation of Chemicals in the European Union (PhD dissertation, 
Florence, Italy: European University Institute, 1999). 
53 A. Alemanno, ‘EU Risk Regulation and Science: The Role of Experts in Decision-Making and Judicial 
Review’ in Vos, n 47 above, 38-39.   
54 Case C-180/96, UK v Commission [1999] ECR I-2265; Case 178/84, Comission v Germany [1987] ECR 
1227; Joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, 
Artegodan v Commission [2002] ECR II-4945. 
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purely EU-internal phenomenon, but is arguably even more pronounced at the 
international level.55 
The argument here is that risk discourses are shaped, in the EU context, by a 
number of factors: the context of trade and economic competitiveness within 
which the EU’s understanding of risk regulation (and of its role as a risk regulator) 
matured; the agenda of EU risk regulation;  and the strategies adopted in order to 
achieve  EU regulatory goals. Again, it is not claimed that each and every single 
piece of EU risk regulation fully accords with this particular discourse, agenda, and 
approach. Many of the ‘high profile’ regulatory regimes, including those governing 
GMOs, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are, however, quintessential 
representatives of the ‘EU version of risk regulation’. Even, moreover,  where it is 
not fully determinative, the dominant profile of EU risk regulation exercises 
considerable influence on how risks are operationalised in EU regulation generally. 
What, then, are the key features of the EU version of risk regulation 
(hereafter: ‘EU risk regulation’)? A first point of note is that EU regulation is 
intensely engaged in the aforementioned practice of carving risk up into discrete, 
manageable segments. The concept of risk in EU risk regulation is, as a result, 
narrowly construed. As a rule, risks are understood as the physical negative side-
effects of entrepreneurship. This approach is tellingly exemplified in GMO 
regulation, which interprets risk as the likelihood of adverse health or 
environmental effects, and staunchly abstains from engaging with broader debates 
on, for instance, the likely cultural impact of GMO farming, the consequences of a 
permissive or restrictive GMO policy on the global political economy, or the 
morality of genetic engineering.56 For the purposes of EU regulation, risk is 
inconceivable outside the European economic context. Differently put, risk 
becomes the concern of EU regulation as a consequence of there being economic 
activity with a cross-boundary impact. This is most apparent in the case of EU 
product regulation, which lays down health, safety, and environmental standards in 
a context of intra-EU trade facilitation. It also resonates in EU environmental 
policy, which governs the environmentally adverse consequences of economic and 
industrial activity if they are potentially transboundary, and if differences in 
                                                     
55To name but a few, G. Shaffer and M. Pollack, When Cooperation Fails. The International Law and Politics of 
Genetically Modified Food (Oxford: OUP, 2009); A. Lang and R. Cooney, ‘Taking Uncertainty Seriously: 
Adaptive Governance, Alien Invasive Species and the WTO' (2007) 18(3) European Journal of International 
Law  523; J. Scott, ‘The European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO’ (2003) Columbia Journal of European 
Law 213; I. Cheyne, ‘Risk and Precaution in World Trade Organization Law’ (2006) 40(5) Journal of World 
Trade 837, and ‘The Precautionary Principle in EC and WTO Law: Searching for a Common 
Understanding’ (2006) 8(4) Environmental Law Review 257; M.C. Cordonnier Segger and M. Gehring, ‘The 
WTO and Precaution: Sustainable Development Implications of the WTO Asbestos Dispute’ (2003) 
15(3) Journal of Environmental Law 289; J. Brunnee and E. Hey (eds), ‘Symposium: The United States 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case’ (1998) 9 Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 3. 
56 See Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed [2003] OJL 268/1; 
Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJL 106/1. 
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domestic environmental risk regulation could upset the level playing field for 
competition.57 
A connected point relates to the concept of foregone opportunities in EU 
risk regulation. These, too, are the subject of a distinctly economic interpretation, 
referring to both the costs of bearing higher regulatory burdens, and foregone 
economic growth. The acceptability of risk, therefore, not only is a function of the 
likelihood and magnitude of narrowly interpreted adverse effects, but also is co-
determined by economic considerations. 
The confined discursive space goes some way towards explaining the EU’s 
behaviour as a risk regulator, as well as its choice of regulatory techniques. It 
would be a serious stretch to portray the EU as an expansive, confident risk 
manager, secure in the knowledge that its perception and values accord with those 
of the European public, and happy to cut any Gordian knots on the way. The 
requirement of an inter-State economic context creates a perennial need for 
justification of EU risk control strategies. This is compounded by the expectation 
built into EU law, inter alia by way of the subsidiarity principle, that EU risk 
regulation will be qualitatively superior and more effective than what the national 
level can offer.58 The agenda of EU risk regulation is, therefore, as preoccupied 
with the task of justifying decision-making, as it is with substituting acceptable for 
unacceptable risk.     
The narrowness of EU risks, the necessary inter-State economic context, and 
the pronounced need for self-justification crystallise into a distinct EU risk 
regulation pathology, characterised, firstly, by a rigorously itemised approach to 
risk management.59 Not only does EU regulation painstakingly circumscribe the 
remit of risk through a strict focus on physical and monetisable adverse impacts, it 
also reviews identified risks substance-by-substance, technological application-by-
application, product-by-product, installation-by-installation, and project-by-
project. The REACH Regulation, for instance, sets up an institutional framework 
and procedures for substance evaluation that zero in on the risk particularities of 
singular chemicals, but are not equipped to generate or even fully integrate 
information on synergistic effects caused by exposure to chemical compounds.60 
Within EU risk regulation, itemisation fosters the representation of risk as 
containable and therefore non-threatening to aspirations of economic growth 
through free enterprise.61 Moreover, itemisation facilitates the involvement of 
regulatory addressees in both the risk characterisation and management process. 
                                                     
57 M. Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005); J. 
Jans and H. Vedder, European Environmental Law (The Netherlands: Europa Law Publishing, 2008). 
58 D. Chalmers, ‘Gauging the Cumbersomeness of EU Law’ (2010, forthcoming) Current Legal Problems. 
59 On the link between oversight, accountability, and risk regulation, see n 3 above, 96. 
60 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction 
of Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, Amending Directive 1999/45/EC 
and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as 
well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 
93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC [2006] OJL 396/1. 
61 cf n 2 above, 673; Morgan, et al, n 32 above, 273-274. 
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Indeed, under the auspices of EU risk regulation, processes of risk identification 
and, increasingly, assessment, management, and even communication are 
characterised by an advanced degree of privatisation.62 Besides alleviating the 
public financial burden of risk regulation – a key consideration for a regulator as 
cash-strapped as the EU – privatisation fulfils vital legitimising functions towards 
the regulatory addressees, who are co-opted within the regulatory process and 
regain some degree of self-determination, albeit within tightly drawn parameters, 
over risk control.  
The pressing demand for justification makes the EU deeply beholden to the 
fiction of certainty in risk decision-making. Regulatory outcomes must appear as 
the necessary consequences of decision-making, taken in accordance with the 
dictates of good governance. The ‘necessity need’ explains the enormous effort 
EU regulation expends on the organisation and normalisation of information-
gathering. Inevitably, risk assessments are based on predictions derived from 
models, statistics, in vitro test results, and short-term observation, but EU 
regulation seeks to boost the credibility of inputs by insisting on their production, 
in prodigious amounts, through rigorously standardised and independently verified 
processes.63 Moreover, EU legislation, case-law and policy documents are studded 
with repeated assurances that, even in areas of pronounced uncertainty, risk 
decision-making must and will happen on the basis of the ‘best available 
information.’64 Adherence to good governance is secured through the formal 
incorporation of governance standards, such as openness and participation, into 
risk regulatory regimes. Thus, EU risk decision-making procedures divert attention 
away from bodies, particularly the Commission, as discretionary decision-makers 
and present regulatory measures as the logical conclusion of information-gathering 
and assessment processes conducted outside the decision-maker’s purview and, 
hence, free from any attempts at tampering or manipulation. The wedge between 
the stages of risk assessment and risk management, as well as the artificiality of 
this particular divide, are familiar features of EU risk regulation. However artificial, 
the separation performs a vital function in amplifying the effect of necessity of 
regulatory outcomes, and allowing the Commission as decision-maker to project 
the image of a dispassionate, neutral arbiter of exogenously generated information, 
rather than a discretionary, unconstrained regulatory force.65 The quest for 
apparent neutrality might also go some way towards explaining the EU’s well-
documented tendency to ‘proceduralise’ over time the interpretation of decision-
                                                     
62 V. Heyvaert, ‘Regulating Chemical Risk: REACH in a Global Governance Perspective’ in J. Eriksson, 
M. Gilek, and C. Ruden (eds), Regulating Chemical Risk: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on European and Global 
Challenges (New York: Springer, 2010 forthcoming); and E. Fisher, ‘The 'Perfect Storm' of REACH: Charting 
Regulatory Controversy in the Age of Information, Sustainable Development, and Globalization’ (2008) 
9(2) Journal of Risk Research 541, 548. 
63 cf C. Hood and H. Rothstein, ‘Risk Regulation under Pressure: Problem Solving or Blame Shifting?’ 
(2001) 33(1) Administration and Society 21, 40. 
64 Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, n 45 above; Case C-236/01, Monsanto 
Agricoltura Italia SpA v Council [2003] ECR I-8105; Heyvaert, n 45 above, 201. 
65 T. Porter, Trust in Numbers: the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
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making principles, such as the proportionality principle and the precautionary 
principle.66 
To recap, the EU’s understanding of risk as a regulatory trigger is narrow, 
highly compartmentalised, and perceived against a backdrop of inter-State 
economic activity. EU risk regulation aims both to reconcile its understanding of 
health, environmental, and economic objectives within decision-making on 
acceptable risk, and to legitimise said decision-making. The pursuit of these 
objectives dictates reliance on a regulatory methodology that is geared towards the 
creation of actionable ‘facts’, that maintains a strict functional and institutional 
separation between fact-finding and decision-making, and that displays a highly 
formalised approach to good governance.    
 
 
 
THE CLIMATE RISK PARADIGM 
 
Compared to the wealth of studies dissecting and critiquing every conceivable 
aspect of EU risk regulation, climate change as a regulatory project is still under-
theorised. This is hardly surprising, taking into account its relative youth, and the 
enormous complexity of climate change as a political, economic, social, 
environmental, scientific, and cultural challenge for regulation to come to terms 
with. The following paragraphs make an admittedly preliminary contribution to 
the articulation of an EU paradigm of climate change risk regulation (to avoid the 
cumbersomeness of the term, ensuing references are to the ‘climate risk 
paradigm’). As with the review of EU risk regulation, the approach is analytical: 
the aim is to trace the contours of the climate risk paradigm as it emerges from 
EU legislation, policy statements, and regulatory instruments; not to prescribe the 
ideal ingredients for a climate change strategy. The analysis serves a twofold 
ambition: it lays a foundation for further study and critique; and creates a fuller 
picture against which to gauge concerns over risk-based approaches to climate 
change regulation.  
One of the most eye-catching features of the concept of climate risk as it 
matures in the EU is that, for all the uncertainty that surrounds the science of 
climate change, the EU accepts and promotes the reality of man-made global 
warming as a political fact.67 The overall target of a maximum 2° C rise, and the 
determination of maximum emission levels cutting back 8, 20, or 30 per cent 
respectively from 1990 emissions levels, were forged in a political process 
                                                     
66 J. Corkin. ‘Science, Legitimacy and the Law: Regulating Risk Regulation Judiciously in the European 
Community’ (2008) 33(3) European Law Review 359; Heyvaert, n 45 above, 196; V. Heyvaert, ‘Trade and 
the Environment: Proportionality Substituted?’ (2001) 13(3) Journal of Environmental Law 392; Case C-
473/98 Chemikalieninspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I-5681; Case C-309/02 Radlberger [2004] 
ECR I-11763; Case C-320/03, Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-9871. 
67 See, eg, Commission Communication on Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change 
COM(2005)35 final. 
  
Veerle Heyvaert                                       Europe in a Climate of Risk  
 
 17
culminating in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the adoption the 2002 
and 2009 Council Decisions;68 not in a regulatory process orchestrated by the 
European Commission, a European Agency, Member States Committees, 
regulatory addressees, and public and private interest groups. Although European 
economic competitiveness is undeniably a crucial factor in the EU discourse on 
climate change, as it is in EU risk regulation, it is explicitly recognised not to be 
the only benchmark against which the EU climate change strategy should take 
shape. Instead, and in accordance with the heavily EU-sponsored UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol, there is an open acknowledgement of climate change as a global 
threat, of the EU’s role in contributing to the threat, and of its commensurate 
responsibility vis-à-vis third countries in mitigating and furthering adaptation to 
climate change.69 In this context, we should furthermore bear in mind that the EU 
has staked its reputation as a global political leader in no small amount on its 
ability to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation on the international 
agenda.70 Thus, it has politically invested in the reality of the climate change risk to 
an extent that does not characterise other EU risk policies.71  
The EU’s political investment in the reality of global warming, together with 
the expectation that climate change will wreak most havoc in those regions that 
historically contributed least to global warming, affects both the understanding of 
risk and of opportunity within the European discourse. Consider, first, the shifting 
nature of ‘risk-taking’ in the climate change debate. Whereas, before, ‘risk taking’ 
was routinely associated with an active engagement with the new (such as the 
commercialisation of a new technology or the establishment of a new industrial 
facility, which activity must be assessed, controlled and, if necessary, curtailed),72 
the European climate risk paradigm increasingly links risk to inaction.73 In other 
areas of health and environmental risk regulation, business-as-usual tends to 
function as a relatively stable benchmark, referring to a set of practices and 
techniques that are usually susceptible to incremental tweaking and upgrading, but 
                                                     
68Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 Concerning the Approval, on Behalf of the European 
Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Joint Fulfilment of Commitments Thereunder [2002] OJL 130/1; European Parliament and 
Council Decision 406/2009/EC of 23 April 2009 on the Effort of Member States to Reduce Their 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction 
Commitments up to 2020 [2009] OJL 140/136. 
69 Commission White Paper - Adapting to Climate Change: Towards a European Framework for Action 
COM(2009)147 final, 1 April 2009. 
70 The opening lines of ‘20 20 by 2020’ are: ‘2007 marked a turning point for the European Union's 
climate and energy policy. Europe showed itself ready to give global leadership: to tackle climate change, 
to face up to the challenge of secure, sustainable and competitive energy, and to make the European 
economy a model for sustainable development in the 21st century’ (n 30 above). 
71 See M. Scheurs and Y. Thibergien, ‘Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union 
Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation’ (2007) 7(4) Global Environmental Politics 19; F. Yamin, ‘The Role 
of the EU in Climate Negotiations’ in J. Gupta and M. Grubb (eds), Climate Change and European 
Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? (USA: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2000). 
72 cf O’Malley on the ‘enterprising subject’, n 46 above, 465; and R. Brockhaus, ‘Risk-Taking Propensity 
of Entrepreneurs’ (1980) 23 Academy of Management Journal 509. 
73 European Environment Agency, Climate Change: The Cost of Inaction and the Cost of Adaptation (EEA 
Technical Report Nr 13/2007).  
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that are rarely, if ever, in need of a complete overhaul. In the climate risk 
paradigm, the relationship between stability and change is inverted, with business-
as-usual becoming the path that leads to epic, unpredictable, and possibly 
catastrophic change.  
Secondly, the concept of risk in climate change has become singularly and 
exceptionally divorced from the positive connotations of risk-taking; it is 
considered morally suspect even to contemplate foregone opportunities in the 
wake of climate change mitigation.74 At most, EU policy documents will concede 
that rising temperatures might have some discrete beneficial impacts, such as a 
decline in cold-related deaths during winter, but these are rarely quantified, in 
marked contrast to predicted negative impacts.75 Nor is it suggested that any such 
localised positive impacts should affect determinations on the need for mitigation. 
The resounding message emanating from the EU’s climate change policy is that 
global warming is an unambiguous social bad, and that no amount of accidental 
positive side-effects could ever tilt the scales in favour of regulatory relaxation, let 
alone inaction. When ‘20 20 by 2020’ talks of the climate change opportunity, it 
refers to the scope for economic growth and competitiveness in the wake of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, and most decidedly not to 
what Europe stands to gain in the absence of climate change control.76 
A further point on risk conceptualisation is that the climate change discourse 
is certainly undergoing a degree of compartmentalisation, as law and policy makers 
seek to divide the amorphous and intellectually overwhelming prospect of global 
warming into discrete economic, health, environmental, social, and security 
threats.  However, this process has not yet reached the maturity or thoroughness 
of compartmentalisation in EU risk regulation.77 More importantly, the nature of 
climate change risks severely hampers a traditional core function of 
compartmentalisation, which is to make problems manageable and attributable. 
Even if we hone in on the risk caused by rising temperatures to the survival of a 
single species, climate change remains a risk caused by a near-endless range of 
diffuse sources of GHG emissions, happening as a consequence of how we, and 
more specifically industrialised societies, have organised our lives, rather than as a 
result of a particular technology, product, or service that we chose to embrace.78 
Hence, unless we resign ourselves to an adaptation-only strategy, lowering the 
threat of extinction for, say, the red columbus monkey cannot be accomplished 
through a discrete measure mandating and organising the conservation of red 
columbus monkeys, but must be achieved through an arsenal of instruments 
                                                     
74 cf Ellen Goodman’s article in the Boston Globe of 9 February 2007, comparing climate change deniers 
with Holocaust deniers: E. Goodman, ‘No Change in Political Climate’ (9 February 2007) The Boston 
Globe. 
75 See Commission Communication on Winning the Battle Against Climate Change COM(2005)35 final, 
9 February 2005, Annex.  
76 n 30 above. 
77 See the EU’s climate and energy package at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm. 
78 cf G. Prins and S. Rayner, ‘Time to Ditch Kyoto’ (2007) 449 Nature 974; Bulkeley, n 32 above, 432. 
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governing areas as diverse as car manufacturing, carbon markets, fuel subsidies, 
CCS investment, nuclear energy, congestion charging, and waste disposal. 
The impossibility of a discrete regulatory response to climate change also 
invites some preliminary considerations on the nature of uncertainty in the EU 
climate risk paradigm. Under the EU risk regulation paradigm, uncertainty 
predominantly relates to the seriousness of adverse impacts. A pivotal function of 
the regulatory process is to translate such ‘impact uncertainty’ into a fictional but 
actionable form of certainty through highly formalised processes of information 
gathering and risk assessment. We recall the effort expended on the 
transformation of discretionary decisions into necessary outcomes of thoroughly 
documented and rigidly organised procedures. In contrast, far less effort goes into 
legitimising the effectiveness of risk control techniques; this is generally taken for 
granted.79 Differently put, the legitimacy-enhancing features built into  EU risk 
regulation overwhelmingly aim to buttress EU decisions on whether and to what 
extent to intervene; not to justify the choice of risk control instruments  per se. 
Climate change regulation is set to confront uncertainty in a markedly different 
way.  From a regulatory perspective, the burning question is not whether global 
warming presents an unacceptable risk and, hence, whether the EU is justified in 
adopting risk reduction measures. The answer to both these issues is a matter of 
political ‘fact’ – the EU and the Member States have firmly pinned their colours to 
the mast. Rather, the question is how to curb this acknowledged unacceptable risk, 
what cocktail of assessment techniques, standards, restrictions, and incentives to 
rely on.80 Whereas EU risk regulation faces its toughest legitimacy battles when 
grappling with impact uncertainty, climate change regulation is likely to confront 
its greatest challenges when responding to control uncertainty. Indeed, whether the 
EU’s climate change regulation will be successful is effectively unanswerable at 
                                                     
79 EU regulatory regimes display a surprisingly high degree of stability in their choice of risk control 
techniques, particularly considering the EU’s reputation as an engine of perpetual regulatory reinvention. 
Effectiveness deficits are typically explained as deficiencies in the reach or speed of regulatory decision-
making, or as failures in implementation and enforcement. Hence, they are remedied by tightening up 
standards, streamlining and centralising decision-making and implementation, and stepping up the 
policing of enforcement, rather than by rethinking incumbent approaches to risk control. The point has 
been made previously that, for all its claims to innovation, the risk control strategies laid down in 
REACH regime show a high degree of continuity with those of the preceding regulatory framework. See 
V. Heyvaert, ‘Guidance Without Constraint: Assessing the Impact of the Precautionary Principle on the 
European Community’s Chemicals Policy’ (2006) 6 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 27, 52. The 
more recent reforms of the EU pesticide control regime betray a similar degree of strategic and 
instrumental continuity. On the judicial front, the Greenpeace case offers an interesting illustration of the 
European Court’s effectiveness assumptions regarding EU risk regulation. The Court denied that it might 
be appropriate for a Member State to halt an EU decision-making process once it had been set in motion, 
reasoning that the EU regime was fully equipped to cope with risks, including risks that came to light 
after the process had started. The fact that the regulatory regime in question was contained in the 1990 
Directive on Deliberate Release of GMOs, which had failed to deliver acceptable GMO authorisation 
outcomes and had been effectively defunct for several years by the time of the ECJ’s ruling in the 
Greenpeace case, underscores the extent to which the ECJ’s belief in risk regulatory effectiveness is a 
matter of principle rather than experience. Case C-6/99, Association Greenpeace France v Ministere de 
l’Agriculture et de la Peche [2000] ECR I-1651. 
80 cf Bulkeley, n 32 above, 431 (regarding the climate change on the Australian political and regulatory 
agenda). 
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present; such is the diversity and complexity of the EU’s climate change mitigation 
and adaptation package. Moreover, the EU’s regulatory programme might become 
an exercise in futility if other industrial and industrialising countries such as the 
USA, China, and India refuse or fail to curb their GHG emissions. Legitimation 
debates, therefore, will more likely revolve around the effectiveness than the 
necessity of risk control measures. 
The climate change regulatory agenda could in general terms be described as 
the substitution of acceptable for unacceptable risk, thus matching that of risk 
regulation. However, under the surface of this broad common denominator, we 
find a number of interesting and challenging idiosyncrasies. In policy terms, the 
aspired-for substitution of acceptable risk is driven by not one, but two distinct yet 
interdependent strategies: a mitigation and an adaptation strategy.81 Moreover, 
recalling the inverted relationship between stability and change, the objective of 
the climate change regulatory agenda is as much about directing as it is about 
controlling change. Hence, the substitution process between acceptable and 
unacceptable risks happens through a combination of preventative and remedial 
risk control measures. Risk control cannot solely be achieved through ‘better’ 
management of  existing practices, but also must be accomplished through the 
introduction of new practices and technologies, which in turn will trigger the 
adoption of new technological risk control strategies.82 The EU’s mandate as a risk 
regulator for climate change therefore covers both its contribution to global 
warming abatement, and its risk regulation of climate change abatement and 
adaptation strategies. This results in the formation of a dual agenda the objectives 
of which may not always be synchronised, and at times even at odds. 
The distinct characteristics of climate change risks and the composite nature 
of the regulatory agenda pose unique challenges to the development of an EU 
regulatory strategy for climate change. As in EU risk regulation, information 
gathering is pivotal, but the range of data is much more diverse, and the sources 
much more dispersed. This implies, inter alia, that climate change regulatory 
frameworks cannot be self-sufficient in meeting their information needs to the 
extent that, for instance, pharmaceuticals regulation can, but hinge on much more 
fluid and diverse configurations of inputs. In terms of standard-setting, the EU 
must seek to achieve its regulatory ambitions not through single, designated sets of 
rules, but through intricate combinations of measures that either amend existing 
frameworks or create new ones, and that tend to be either much blunter or 
considerably more subtle than the approaches that characterise traditional EU risk 
regulation. Indeed, the political commitment to climate change rendered possible 
the adoption of strict, across-the-board, and ambitious CO2 emission reduction 
targets, representing a degree of EU regulatory aggression than would be hard to 
                                                     
81 Commission Communication on Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius – the Way Ahead for 2020 and 
Beyond COM(2007)2 final, 10 January 2007; and Commission White Paper on White Paper on Adapting to Climate 
Change: Towards a European Framework for Action COM(2009)147 final, 1 April 2009. 
82 cf D. Farber, ‘Confronting Uncertainty under NEPA’ (2009) 8(3) Issues in Legal Scholarship. Balancing the 
Risks: Managing Technology and Dangerous Climate Change 1. 
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replicate in other areas. On the other hand, we recall that climate change 
regulation is not only about controlling but also about mandating and directing 
change. This calls for the design of dirigistic and technology-forcing measures, 
which, in the context of climate change, are developed under conditions of severe 
control uncertainty. Hence, the EU must resort to instruments that facilitate rather 
than constrain, that seek to optimise the conditions for change in line with the 
pre-set regulatory targets but are flexible enough not to mandate change, so that it 
remains possible for Member States and private parties to respond to updated 
information which might point in a different technological or organisational 
direction. The needs for flexibility, openness to adaptation, and technological 
insurability far exceed those of other risk regulatory regimes. Hence, the 
instrumental parsimony that typifies the EU risk regulation paradigm, where 
individualised safety objectives are pursued through a single or narrow set of 
control techniques (eg, pharmaceutical safety through product authorisation; 
chemical substance safety through registration, evaluation, and use authorisation) 
is lost within the realm of climate risk regulation, which must summon a dazzling 
variety of regulatory instruments and control techniques to pursue its stated 
objectives of climate change mitigation and adaptation.  
 
 
 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT: COLONISATION, CO-EXISTENCE, OR 
CROSS-REGIME LEARNING 
 
The foregoing discussion reveals that, although ‘risk’ is a pivotal axis around which 
risk regulation, EU risk regulation, and climate change regulation revolve, each 
domain constructs and responds to its own conceptualisation of regulatory risk – 
and each carries its own distinct agenda and strategies. To recap, the risk 
regulation paradigm targets the substitution of acceptable for unacceptable risk, is 
rooted in a belief in causation in that regulatory responses can affect levels of risk, 
and pursues its agenda through the individualisation of risk into discrete, 
manageable threats of future harm. The compartmentalisation of risk into a set of 
discrete management projects is particularly pronounced within the EU risk 
regulation paradigm. The latter is also typified by an overriding need to justify and 
legitimise regulatory decisions to intervene, which fosters the adoption of scientific 
data-intensive and heavily proceduralised regulatory frameworks. The EU climate 
risk paradigm, finally, is buoyed by a degree of political commitment to risk 
control that is lacking from other areas of EU risk regulation, but the highly 
complex and global nature of climate change causation challenges the function of 
risk compartmentalisation, and imbues regulatory responses with an 
unprecedented degree of control uncertainty. If we are to understand the way that 
EU regulation will develop as a response to climate change it is accordingly 
essential to appreciate how these three different paradigms – or agendas – will play 
roles, and will interact, within  the broad thrust of EU regulation. Much, here will 
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depend on the ways in which the three approaches come to resolution – and, 
notably, whether there will be colonisation, co-existence, or cross-regime learning. 
 
COLONISATION 
 
In light of the differences observed between the risk regulation, the EU risk 
regulation, and the climate risk paradigm, concerns about the appropriateness of 
processing climate change challenges through a risk-based model do appear to 
have a prima facie validity. If EU climate change regulation is erected from the same 
building blocks that support the EU risk regulatory framework, the resulting 
regime will most likely fail to deliver effective instruments for climate change 
governance in accordance with the EU’s aspirations for ‘20 20 by 2020’. The 
pursuit of an itemised approach to climate risk control, where diverse contributing 
factors to global warming are individualised and assessed in isolation from the 
overall context of mitigation and adaptation strategies, could result in the adoption 
of disjointed, at times counter-productive, risk control measures adopted at an 
excruciatingly slow speed, which would render the regime wholly incapable of 
delivering substantial emission cuts within the projected time scales. Moreover, the 
EU approach to risk assessment and risk management, which is highly formalised, 
functionally and institutionally sequential, which heavily privileges scientific 
evidence of discrete health and environmental risks as the foundation and 
justification for decision-making, and acknowledges alternative sources of 
information to the extent that they voice socio-economic concerns relevant to the 
EU, does not respond to either the global nature of the climate change risk or the 
global political aspirations that co-determine the EU’s climate change policy. 
Finally, while the EU risk regulation paradigm does provide opportunities for 
learning, review, and adaptation, adaptation processes are generally contained 
within individual regulatory frameworks and are carried out at the micro-level, 
resulting in tweaking rather than systemic change. The climate change regime, 
which contends with exponentially higher levels of control uncertainty, would be 
ill-served by a regulatory framework that only accommodates incremental 
change.83 
These are but three examples of potential regime misfits; further reflection 
would undoubtedly generate more. Although incomplete, they clearly point at 
deficiencies resulting from a wholesale colonisation of climate change by EU risk 
regulation, and exhort EU law and policy-makers to develop self-awareness about 
their distinct conception of climate risks in the design of regulatory responses, 
even if it means veering off the tried and tested path of EU risk regulation. As EU 
climate change regulation is presently in a rapid expansion phase, the message is 
urgent, all the more so since some of the recently adopted pieces of EU climate 
change legislation do show worrying signs of colonisation. The 2009 Directive on 
                                                     
83 cf D. Kysar, ‘Climate Change, Cultural Transformation and Comprehensive Rationality’ (2004) 31 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review  555. 
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the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide (CCS Directive),84 for example, 
approaches the environmental risks posed by CCS technology in a notably insular 
manner, highly reminiscent of the compartmentalisation of, say, the risks of 
contemporary farming into, among others, water pollution risks, pesticide risks, 
and GMO risks. Although the preamble asserts that CCS technology ‘should not 
serve as an incentive to increase the share of fossil fuel power plants’, nor ‘lead to 
a reduction of efforts to support energy saving policies, renewable energies and 
other safe and sustainable low carbon technologies’, the Directive’s objectives are 
narrowly constructed and focus on ensuring that novel CCS technology is 
deployed in an environmentally safe way. The Directive addresses the risk of 
carbon leakage, but understands ‘leakage’ only as the involuntary escape of CO2 
from a storage complex; not as the resurgence of fossil fuel industries, whether in 
the EU or outside of it, in the wake of the commercialisation of CCS technology.85 
And even though the acceptability of the environmental risks posed by CCS 
technology will at least partly depend on the success of alternative mitigation 
approaches, the Directive’s rather anaemic-looking framework for the risk 
assessment of storage sites does not offer any entry-points for contextual 
information to be introduced.   
A final point to consider its that, in addition to the risks of colonisation for 
climate change regulation itself, a failure to develop a suitable regulatory regime 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation could undermine the (already 
contested) effectiveness of existing EU risk regulation. For instance, rules on the 
planting of genetically modified crops and on co-existence are developed on the 
assumption of these crops maturing under relatively stable ecological conditions 
that are knowable and analysed when applications for authorisation are made. 
Climatological change could rapidly and drastically affect the ecosystem and 
climate in which GMO crops grow, and hence obliterate the value of conducted 
risk assessments.86 
 
CO-EXISTENCE 
 
Climate change regulation is not necessarily doomed to tread the barren path of 
colonisation. In a more positive scenario, the burgeoning body of climate change 
regulation will increasingly articulate its own risk discourse, set its agenda, and 
develop methodological tools commensurate with the nature of the risks it seeks 
to govern. Recent developments in climate change governance, characterised by 
the establishment of a growing range of political and bureaucratic bodies with 
specific responsibilities for climate change at the national and European level, to 
the exclusion of a general environmental or health mandate, might actually 
facilitate the emancipation of the climate risk paradigm and the development of a 
                                                     
84 [2009] OJ L140/14. 
85 cf M. Babiker, ‘Climate Policy, Market Structure and Carbon Leakage’ (2005) 65(2) Journal of International 
Economics 421. 
86 M. Zinn, ‘Adapting to Climate Change in a Warmer World’ (2007) ELQ 61, 64.  
                06/2010 
 
 24
sui generis regulatory regime.87 Such a regime would probably be less attuned to, for 
example, the specific ‘trade versus environment’ preoccupations of EU risk 
regulation, but might in contrast devote more regulatory resources to the 
management of control uncertainty.88 It might explore options for flexibility and 
adaptation between rather than within regulatory frameworks, and develop 
decision-making procedures that are better equipped to integrate and respond to 
the broader range of political, environmental, economic, and social interests that 
collide within the field of climate change. Going back to the carbon capture and 
storage example, under a full-fledged climate risk paradigm the 2009 Directive 
would engage not only with the risks of CCS technology having environmentally 
harmful effects, but also with those of CCS as a technological response failing to 
contribute sufficiently to the desired degree of global climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. The Directive would need to develop new tools to construct and 
evaluate the risks caused by control uncertainty within the regulatory framework, 
and introduce decision-making criteria and procedural guarantees to optimise the 
legitimacy of control risk evaluation. It would need to incorporate response 
mechanisms enabling it to act upon fluctuating control risks. It is a daunting list of 
desiderata, but it equally represents a fantastic new challenge for the field of risk 
regulation studies to re-invent itself and broaden its field of exploration. 
The development of two regulatory regimes operating at arm’s length is, in 
my opinion, preferable to the scenario where climate change is shoehorned into 
the dominant format of EU risk regulation, but that does not make it an ideal 
solution. History attests that in ‘separate but equal’ relations, true equality is rarely 
found. EU risk regulation could still overshadow climate change regulation. Or, 
conversely, the ascendance of a climate risk paradigm might eclipse and ultimately 
marginalise the discourse and agenda of EU risk regulation. This is not a purely 
hypothetical concern: as many environmental researchers and scholars across 
disciplines will attest, when it comes to securing funding or reaching a broad 
audience, climate change is pretty much the only game in town.89 With political, 
regulatory, scholarly, and media attention pronouncedly channelled towards 
climate change, it does not exactly take a leap of the imagination to see the field of 
EU risk regulation as potentially exposed to a long dry spell. From this 
perspective, the boomtown nature of climate change institution-building in the 
past five years assumes a rather more ominous character.  
 
CROSS-REGIME LEARNING 
 
Even if the EU risk regulation paradigm and the climate risk paradigm manage to 
co-exist peacefully, we can envisage a superior outcome. In a third and 
                                                     
87 ‘Hedegaard Becomes New EU Climate Commissioner’ ENDS Europe Daily (29 November 2009). 
88 J. Lefevere, ‘A Climate of Change: An Analysis of Progress in EU and International Climate Change 
Policy’ in J. Scott (ed), Environmental Protection. European Law and Governance (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 171, 183. 
89 See, in this context, Tony Giddens’ related argument that climate change is too important to be treated 
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unabashedly optimistic scenario, the two regulatory regimes corresponding to, 
respectively, the EU risk regulation and the climate risk paradigm would indeed 
run along separate tracks, but at various points their paths would intersect, 
creating opportunities for comparison and exchange, to their respective benefit as 
they set off again on their individual journeys. In this third scenario, the EU and 
climate risk regulation paradigm would not only evolve on the basis of internally 
generated experience, but also through cross-regime learning. 
The imagery of autonomous but kindred spirits meeting at cross-roads and 
departing again, each with different destinations but both enriched by the contact, 
may seem leagues removed from the nuts and bolts of regulation. Moreover, until 
the climate risk paradigm acquires a stable enough identity to function as the 
reference frame for the articulation of an autonomous regulatory regime, separate 
from yet co-existing with the EU risk regulatory regime, the identification of 
specific opportunities for cross-regime learning must of necessity remain 
speculative. However, the preceding analysis does offer a solid enough foundation 
to enable speculation in a reasoned rather than random manner. At a basic level, 
awareness of different risk discourses, and their impact on the agenda and 
strategies of regulation, could spur further investigation into health and 
environmental risk control challenges that are thus far insufficiently articulated or 
lumped together under the broad heading of EU risk regulation. One area that 
might considerably benefit from such exercise is biodiversity protection, which has 
a risk profile that is quite distinct from that of technological and product risks, but 
is characterised by regulatory strategies in the typical EU risk regulation mould, 
displaying a high degree of compartmentalisation, dependence on scientific 
evidence, and itemised decision-making. They are also notoriously ineffective at 
curbing biodiversity loss.90 Further investigation of whether and the extent to 
which biodiversity risks behave like EU health and environmental risks, or 
alternatively like climate risks, or whether they constitute a third and separate 
category, could stimulate the development of a more suitable, and potentially more 
effective, approach to biodiversity regulation. 
The EU risk regulation and climate risk paradigms could also function as 
valuable counterpoints in the analysis of regime weaknesses. If subservience to 
scientific rationality is a notorious weak spot of EU risk regulation, then the 
Achilles heel of climate change regulation may well be its dependence on the 
Member States’ continued political willingness to subscribe to the EU’s ambitious 
mitigation and adaptation strategy in the face of overwhelming control 
uncertainty. Hence, whereas commentators have called for a re-politicising of EU 
risk regulation in order to balance its in-built tendencies towards formalisation, 
compartmentalisation, and rationalisation, the survival of the climate change 
regulatory package might on the contrary hinge on the extent to which it can 
develop an autonomous raison d’être, with some degree of independence from the 
                                                     
90 See A. Ross, ‘Modern Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (2009) 36(1) Journal of Law and 
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political context in which the climate risk paradigm took shape.91 In considering 
de- or re-politicising strategies, the experiences gained under the two respective 
regimes could offer invaluable input. 
Climate change control as an EU regulatory project is still in its infancy. As it 
matures, further opportunities for cross-regime learning are sure to emerge. For 
instance, the fictions of certainty and necessity, already fragile within the EU risk 
regulation paradigm, are bound to shatter against the overwhelming uncertainties 
of climate change control. It is hardly possible to imagine that, in this area, the EU 
would be able to make any stronger claims than it is doing the best it can, learning 
as it goes along, adapting in response to new experience, and correcting earlier 
mistakes. Moreover, the presence of an overall, quantified target against which the 
EU’s regulatory success, or lack thereof, can be measured, should sour any 
appetite for Panglossian enthusiasm. The development of new legitimating 
strategies in the face of systemic control uncertainty will offer important lessons 
on the EU’s ability (or lack thereof) to step out of its eudemonic rationale and 
justify itself without firm guarantees of regulatory superiority. This experience 
could, in turn, prove wonderfully instructive for EU risk regulation, which displays 
a keen awareness of the stifling impact of eudemonia, but has thus far not been 
able to muster a credible response.92 
As to instructive exchanges flowing in the opposite direction, the EU risk 
regulatory experience, and particularly its history of contestation, will undoubtedly 
remain a crucial source of inspiration for the climate risk regime. For instance, the 
EU regulatory regime governing food safety has faced formative internal and 
external legitimacy challenges,93 which have forced EU regulatory bodies and 
reviewing bodies alike to grapple with many of risk regulation’s most intractable 
challenges, ranging from the role of local preferences within Europeanised 
decision-making procedures to the reconciliation between competing expectations 
of timeliness, certainty, and inclusiveness of EU rule-making. For all their 
limitations, EU institutions have tried to respond to calls for better governance, 
greater responsiveness, and resilience of risk regulation. The political momentum 
in favour of action against climate change may thus far have supplied a degree of 
insulation against claims of illegality and illegitimacy, but the cracks are already 
appearing,94 as the turmoil surrounding the adoption of the 2009 climate change 
package attests.95 Once climate change regulation starts to bite at the local level, 
and particularly if adaptation policies are reeled into the sphere of EU governance, 
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contestation will be all but inevitable. The EU risk regulatory experience of 
challenge and response, and of the opportunities and limitations created through 
response and reform, will be invaluable to the climate risk paradigm as it seeks out 
and defines its approach to governance. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The rapid expansion of climate change control as a regulatory programme calls for 
a thorough consideration of its underlying ideas, objectives, and strategies. Spurred 
by observations on the rise of risk in climate change, as well as growing concerns 
about this development, this paper proposed to structure the debate by mapping 
out salient features of the risk regulation paradigm, the EU risk regulation 
paradigm, and the emerging climate risk paradigm, arguing that a better 
understanding of the similarities and differences between them is helpful, first, in 
gauging the risks of risk colonisation and, second, in developing a regulatory 
response to climate change commensurate with the EU’s aspirations and 
objectives. Although preliminary, the analysis of the three paradigms reinforces 
concerns over the appropriateness of risk regulation, and particularly the EU 
version of risk regulation, as the dominant conceptual framework for climate 
change governance. The above arguments, accordingly,  favour the development 
of autonomous, co-existing regulatory regimes, enabled by a further articulation 
and emancipation of the climate risk paradigm, and explore opportunities for the 
harnessing of both EU risk regulation and climate change regulation through 
cross-regime learning. 
The pronounced degree of individualisation and itemisation that characterises 
the EU risk regulation paradigm, certainly contributes to the conclusion that the 
former is not a wholly appropriate template for the development of climate risk 
control strategies. The irony that concerns over itemisation end up in support of 
an argument for the development of separate, ‘individual’ risk paradigms, will not 
be lost on anyone. However, the idea behind promoting co-existence and cross-
regime learning rather than colonisation is not to narrow the field of risk 
regulation by excluding climate change from its purview, but rather to revitalise it 
through a greater awareness of the richness and diversity within the regulatory 
landscape.96 Thus, in keeping with the EU spin of the moment, climate change is 
not a threat, but an opportunity for the future of risk regulation. 
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